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“ALONGSIDE THE BEST”?
The Future of the Canadian Forces
Andrew C. Richter
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Canadian Forces face a rangeof challenges. Reduced defense spending, uncertainty regarding missions
and tasks, and the lingering effects of recent scandal have resulted in a signifi-
cantly diminished military. In the midst of a rapidly emerging “revolution in
military affairs” (RMA), the Canadian Forces (CF) are poorly positioned to in-
troduce next-generation weapon systems.1 At the same time, Canada’s allies, in
particular the United States, have undertaken dramatic defense modernization
programs. It is this divergence—Canada’s reduced military capability at a time
of swiftly advancing technology—that will be the focus of this article. Spe-
cifically, the article will examine the degree to which the Canadian Forces are
currently interoperable with its allies, and the steps that need to be taken if they
are to remain a viable fighting force in the future. It will suggest that rather than
maintaining the current (largely fictitious) goal of “multi-purpose, combat
capable” forces—as called for in Canada’s 1994 defense white paper—the CF
needs to prioritize among the services to ensure that
at least one maintains a wide range of interoperability
capabilities.2
The service that can make the best case for first
priority is the navy, as a result of its modern fleet,
widespread political support, and broad range of mis-
sions tihat it can undertake.3 While this will not be an
easy decision for the Department of National Defence
(DND), a failure to make it will have enormous
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consequences, as a “rusted out” military will be incapable of carrying out Cana-
dian defense and foreign policy goals. In addition, given the importance that
Canada places on participating in multilateral operations, it is critical that Can-
ada maintain at least some meaningful capacity to do so.4
As a preliminary, “prioritization” should be defined. In the context of this ar-
ticle, it refers to a process whereby one service receives the majority of the depart-
ment budget and, in particular, the preponderance of the capital equipment
budget. The prioritized service is able to field more modern equipment over a
shorter time frame than would otherwise be the case. Prioritization does not
mean that the other two services would disappear or that they would not receive
funding for their own reequipment programs. On the contrary, they would re-
main vital in the contemporary strategic environment, and both would retain
valuable capabilities. However, given Canada’s limited security spending (to be
examined below) and the enormous cost of modern defense equipment, it will
simply not be possible to modernize all three services adequately. Prioritization
will produce one service capable of undertaking a broad range of missions and
tasks; the other two will focus, if they are to remain viable, on one or two pri-
mary missions—missions that do not require disproportionate funding.
Over the last decade, military technology has been transformed, a development
with which all countries have had to deal. At one end of the spectrum is the
United States, which because of its economic power, global responsibilities, and
enormous defense establishment has eagerly embraced military change.5 In-
deed, the U.S. military has long emphasized advanced technology in pursuit of
its strategic and military objectives, and thus the current RMA is entirely consis-
tent with traditional American thinking.6 While recognizing that pursuing the
RMA will be an expensive undertaking, the United States has demonstrated that
it is committed to maintaining the world’s most advanced defense force. The
2002 U.S. defense budget is $340 billion, roughly equivalent to the combined to-
tal spent by all other countries.7
The response of U.S. allies, however, to these changes has been less certain. To
begin with, there has been considerable frustration that the long-hoped-for
(and much anticipated) “peace dividend” at the end of the Cold War proved so
fleeting. While defense spending in Europe and Canada had never reached the
level that it did in the United States during the four-decade dispute with the So-
viet Union, the allies had nonetheless relentlessly emphasized military prepara-
tions and forces, and they consequently expected that once the conflict ended,
substantial military reductions could finally be achieved. Even the realization
that the post–Cold War environment would remain unstable and prone to peri-
odic violence did not appreciably alter this belief. Thus by the mid-1990s, when
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advanced technology promised to transform military forces (and threatened to
render existing forces obsolete), there was a palpable sense of frustration that
large-scale defense expenditures would now be required.
Yet as even a cursory glance at European and Canadian defense preparedness
and spending reveals, this military investment has not taken place in those na-
tions. The modest allied reaction to the RMA can be linked to two critical fac-
tors—the general weakness of many Western countries in the technologies that
are fuelling the RMA, and an unwillingness to spend the money required to field
advanced defense forces. With regard to the first point, it is widely acknowledged
that U.S. companies are at the forefront of the information revolution; as such, it
is they that most often develop advanced technologies that have military appli-
cations.8 In general, U.S. technology and defense companies are stronger and
more competitive than their European and Canadian counterparts. American
companies are usually the first to innovate and to bring important new technol-
ogies to market, which in turn feeds the major defense contractors a continuing
stream of new designs and systems.9
As for the second point, none of the major European allies or Canada seems
prepared to spend the resources necessary to field state-of-the-art defense
forces. While the United States consistently devotes between 3 and 4 percent of
its gross national product to defense, most European allies spend between 2 and
3 percent, while for Canada the figure is an embarrassing 1.2 percent.10 Further,
in contrast to the United States, the allies have not demonstrated a willingness to
increase defense spending substantially post–11 September 2001, a failure that
will result in an even larger spending divergence in the future (indeed, prior to
the terrorist attacks, concern was mounting over the continued defense spend-
ing cuts in several European countries).11 Lastly, the issue is not just how much—
or, more accurately, how little—Europeans spend on defense but what they
spend their money on. Thus, while the European allies collectively spend
approximately 60 percent of what the United States does (i.e., about $180 bil-
lion), they do not have 60 percent of U.S. capabilities.12 As Ethan Kapstein has re-
cently noted, “Europe seems to get ‘less bang for the buck’ than the United
States.”13
The result is a growing “capabilities gap” between the United States and its al-
lies, one that shows no sign of diminishing. This gap was first noted at the time
of the Gulf War, but it was the 1999 Kosovo conflict that clearly revealed a signif-
icant difference in the capabilities of U.S. and European defense forces (not to
mention the virtual chasm that existed between U.S. and Canadian forces).14 In
spite of widespread European and Canadian recognition and discussion of the
problem since that time, the gap has not closed; defense cuts continue to down-
grade military forces.15
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On both sides of the Atlantic there is considerable concern over this gap and
growing unease over its implications. Such concern led the American Defense
Science Board, a senior advisory panel, to undertake a study in 1999 that exam-
ined how U.S. allies were coping with rapid technological change and whether
there were any steps that the United States could take to ease the transition.16
Contrary to the popular view that a rampaging unilateralism has overtaken
Washington, there is a widespread American acceptance of the importance of
working with coalition partners in international security issues. The United
States has realized—perhaps somewhat reluctantly—that it is compelled for
diplomatic as well as practical reasons to ally itself with other actors.17 This cir-
cumstance has applied not only to operations under the authority of the United
Nations or Nato but also in the context of ad hoc coalitions, like the present cam-
paign in Afghanistan.18 However, in spite of this recognition, allied military
weakness may prove to be the Achilles’ heel of such operations. Indeed, there is
growing concern in the United States that such weakness may ultimately in-
crease the risks to American troops, a prospect that could make future strategic
cooperation difficult.
Similarly, Nato officials, after a lengthy period of apparent indifference, now
seem to appreciate the dimensions of the problem. In the most recent reflection
of this newfound awareness, Nato’s secretary general, Lord George Robertson,
warned in February 2002 that if the capabilities gap “[is] allowed to increase, it
will mean there won’t be coalitions in the future because the Americans will not
be able to operate [with the allies].”19 In essence, Robertson’s warning was a re-
statement of one he had made during the Kosovo war, when he had spoken of a
“two speed” alliance, in which Europe would be unable to participate in mis-
sions that the United States led.20
It is difficult to overstate the significance of these warnings or, even more im-
portantly, their sources. There is now recognition within Nato that the inability
of allies to work together on the battlefield will undermine—and perhaps ulti-
mately doom—the alliance. The United States might restrict its role in alliance
missions to providing the advanced logistics, lift, and airpower that it alone
can supply. Tension could arise if European and Canadian armies, accordingly,
find themselves disproportionately responsible for the dangerous manpower-
intensive tasks that can lead to significant casualties.21 Further, the United States
might feel that it is entitled to have a say in alliance decision making commensu-
rate with the fact that it provides the bulk of military assets.22
It is against this backdrop that the debate over Canada’s defense preparedness
and interoperability with the United States is taking place. To many observers,
Canadian defense weakness means that Canada will become a U.S. ally in
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political terms only, unable to make meaningful military contributions to mul-
tilateral coalitions; some critics would suggest that this day has already arrived.
However, Canada’s difficulties in cooperating with the U.S. military and in deal-
ing with advanced defense technology are similar to those of many other Ameri-
can allies and, given the extensive history of defense cooperation between the
two countries, constitute a troubling development. Indeed, since 11 September
2001, the issues related to interoperability have taken on a new urgency in the
North American context, as the various Canadian agencies dealing with border
issues, law enforcement, and intelligence have begun to integrate themselves for-
mally around joint tasks with their American counterparts.23 Perhaps most im-
portantly, a new regional military structure, U.S. Northern Command,
responsible for American homeland defense, became operational on 1 October
2002. NorthCom’s area of operations will include not only the United States and
Canada but Mexico and parts of the Caribbean as well. It is apparent that this
new command will create additional pressure upon the two countries’ militaries
to cooperate.24
Viewed from a broader perspective, then, the Canadian experience with ad-
vanced military technology and interoperability is an interesting case study in
how U.S. allies are adapting to the emerging military and strategic environment.
In this regard, while virtually all Western militaries now acknowledge that some
form of RMA is taking place (and most are trying to identify strategies for deal-
ing with it), their forces are evolving in very gradual, measured ways. Thus, ex-
amining how one key U.S. ally is adapting will tell us much about the challenges
that other actors may face. Most crucially, it will offer lessons useful to Washing-
ton in how to approach allies who wish to participate in multilateral operations,
and it will offer guidelines as to the types of capabilities that allies can be ex-
pected to provide.
The first section of this article examines interoperability itself—what it is and
why it is important. It also briefly looks at recent developments that have made
interoperability such a major concern for the militaries of many countries. The
next part will focus on Canadian defense capabilities in each of the three services
and upon the modernization programs that are presently under way, by way of
determining which service is best positioned to take advantage of the RMA and
what steps need to be taken. The last section offers concluding observations and
findings, as well as suggestions on strategic development in light of the events of
11 September 2001 and the subsequent U.S.-led war on terrorism.
INTEROPERABILITY IN THE CANADA-U.S. CONTEXT
While the concept of interoperability may appear to be relatively straightfor-
ward, in practice interoperability is almost always controversial and difficult to
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realize.25 It is therefore important to have a clear definition of what inter-
operability is and of why its achievement can be so problematic.
According to a recent RAND Corporation study, interoperability “is a mea-
sure of the degree to which various organizations or individuals are able to operate
together to achieve a common goal.”26 Thus interoperability is not necessarily
a military concept but has applications across the business, political, and strate-
gic worlds. For the purposes of this article, though, interoperability will be ex-
amined in its military sense, and hence a more precise definition is required. The
U.S. military defines interoperability as “the ability of systems, units, or forces to
provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces, and
to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”27
This notion of seamless cooperation and efficiency is the hallmark of an
interoperable fighting force. This definition includes issues related to standard-
ization, integration, cooperation, strategy, and defense production.28
Military interoperability can be further defined at the operational and tech-
nical levels.29 Operational interoperability addresses support to military opera-
tions, focusing on people and procedures. Implementation of operational
interoperability involves testing, certification, training, and force configuration.
This definition encompasses the entire spectrum of military operations.30 Tech-
nical interoperability is essential to achieving operational interoperability.
Rather than focusing on people, however, technical interoperability stresses
communications and electronics equipment, ensuring that information can be
relayed quickly and efficiently.31 On the modern battlefield, rapid communica-
tions are a necessity for effective operations—information related to weapon
systems, software and associated operating systems, and intelligence at the com-
mand level. In a worst-case scenario—two militaries with identical weapons as
well as common training and procedures but incompatible communications
and data networks—cooperation will be difficult and the result could be errors,
mistakes, and missed opportunities.
In a general sense, the ultimate goal of interoperability is not to ensure that all
contributors to a coalition will necessarily deploy similar military forces or
weapon systems but rather to achieve a practicable level of cooperation between
their contingents.32 As Danford Middlemiss and Dennis Stairs have recently ar-
gued in a study on interoperability in the Canadian context, “from the military
point of view, the overarching objective is thus to make a militarily relevant and
effective contribution to multinational security efforts at the maximum possible
level of efficiency.”33
But definitions and descriptions alone cannot convey the critical role that
interoperability plays in the contemporary military environment. Recent opera-
tions in Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo, as well as evidence from experiments and
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exercises, point to the dramatic improvement in operational effectiveness that
can be achieved by using advanced command, control, communications, com-
puters, and intelligence systems and sharing information in a timely manner. A
“common operating picture,” along with the associated decision-support capabil-
ities, can have enormous effects on the pace and nature of military engagements.34
This is not to suggest that achieving interoperable defense forces is a simple
task. On the contrary, the challenges posed by differing force structures, weapon
systems, and training techniques highlight the problems of realizing inter-
operability in practice. A recent U.S. study that examined forty coalition opera-
tions identified a long list of difficulties, including divergences between U.S. and
allied forces, differences in decision-making procedures, and communications
discrepancies.35
In addition to such apparent obstacles, a wide range of “soft factors” can
make effective cooperation virtually impossible. Such factors can include dis-
agreement over or misunderstanding of goals, priorities, and rules of engage-
ment; commitment of national forces to incompatible tactical, organizational,
or other professional doctrines; and outright policy disputes.36 Such sources of
divergence can create havoc in the field, particularly when the individual contin-
gents involved are not large enough to be self-sufficient.
However, no discussion of the challenges to interoperability should mask the
real benefits that it offers, particularly to smaller countries. Most significantly,
interoperability enables a country with only modest military capabilities to con-
tribute in a meaningful way to multinational operations.37 Such contributions
tangibly demonstrate a commitment to resolving the conflict at hand. Perhaps
most critically, interoperable military forces offer visibility to other countries,
and they can generate political “IOUs” from coalition partners and allies alike,
chips that can be cashed in at some future point.
At the same time, though, interoperability has political costs, arising espe-
cially from the perception of reduced sovereignty and a general impression of
weakness resulting from acknowledgment that one’s military is no longer able to
act independently. Thus, for example, multilateral missions may involve a signif-
icant loss of decision-making power for the smaller coalition powers and create
an impression that a country has little say in how its forces are used.38 Further-
more, a history of successful military interoperability may create pressure to
participate in future missions, even those that do not have strong domestic po-
litical support, as defense ties are created and military alliances forged.
As far as Canada and the CF are concerned, interoperability has long been a
major goal. Since 1945, Canadian governments have accepted that the country’s
military forces are incapable of defending the country on their own and that as a
result cooperation with the United States and other allies is necessary. Canada
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was therefore a major supporter of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and signed
an air defense agreement with the United States in 1958. Both treaties required
Canada to train and field military forces that could cooperate effectively with al-
lies, although throughout the Cold War (but particularly after 1970) there were
persistent warnings that Canada’s defense forces were inadequate and lacked the
equipment and personnel necessary for sustained military operations.39
The 1994 Defence White Paper reaffirmed the need for Canada to maintain
diverse and capable military forces. The white paper rejected the argument that
Canada required only a defense force largely focused around “constabulary”
tasks;40 instead it held that Canada “needs armed forces that are able to operate
with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations
against a capable opponent—that is, able to fight ‘alongside the best, against the
best.’”41 The white paper left no doubt that Canada needed a modern defense es-
tablishment, one that could cooperate with a U.S. military that was the world
leader in introducing and deploying sophisticated military technology.42
Since that time, in spite of significant defense spending cuts, the goal of an
interoperable CF has been reiterated on several occasions.43 In 1999, DND re-
leased a major planning document intended to mould defense strategy for the
first two decades of the new century. Titled Shaping the Future of Canadian De-
fence: A Strategy for 2020, the study established both short and long-range goals
for the Canadian military. Among those goals was to “strengthen [Canada’s]
military relationship with the U.S. military to ensure Canadian and U.S. forces
are interoperable and capable of combined operations in key selected areas.”44 In
addition, it identified three targets for the next five years: to manage inter-
operability with allies so as to permit “seamless operational integration at short
notice”; to develop a program to adopt new doctrine and equipment compatible
with Canada’s “principal allies”; and to expand the joint and combined exercise
program to include “all environments and exchanges with the U.S.”45 While
interoperability was explicitly discussed in only one of the eight core objectives
identified for the CF, “it is hard to resist the conclusion,” as one observer recently
noted, “that [interoperability with the United States] is the [objective] that mat-
ters most.”46
The goal of interoperability was reaffirmed in Strategic Capability Planning,
released in June 2000 by the vice chief of the Defence Staff. It noted that by
“achieving the goal of interoperability with U.S. forces in particular, who are
currently and for the foreseeable future setting the standard for advanced mili-
tary equipment, [the Canadian Forces] will almost certainly be capable of oper-
ating effectively with the rest of [Canada’s] major allies, providing significant
flexibility in [Canada’s] approach to foreign affairs.”47
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Lastly, in At a Crossroads in 2002, the chief of the Defense Staff again gave pri-
ority to interoperability. This report noted that “maintaining interoperability
remains key to the future relevance of the CF” and highlighted common training
practices, the establishment of joint doctrine, and participation in the Multina-
tional Interoperability Council (which aims to enhance interoperability
through “improved data exchange and operational information”).48
In sum, interoperability is a primary goal of the Canadian Forces.49 However,
at a time when the pace of military innovation is dramatically increasing,
achieving interoperability in practice poses serious challenges.
FORCE STRUCTURE AND SERVICE MODERNIZATION PLANS
The Canadian Forces today suffer the consequences of decades of neglect, inade-
quate funding, and questionable decisions regarding force structure. As a result,
they are in a relatively poor position—at least in comparison to many other West-
ern nations—to field interoperable defense forces and to take advantage of the
RMA. At best, they can pursue what some observers have called a “niche” RMA
strategy, while fielding specialized forces that offer interoperability capabilities.50
The Department of National Defence was slow to recognize the military
changes brought about by the revolution in technology.51 Inertia seemed to be
the primary DND response until around 1998, when a belated effort to study the
revolution in military affairs began.52 This response was slow not only in com-
parison to most of Canada’s allies but came more than a decade after the Penta-
gon first began to recognize and study the RMA.
The combination of the slow departmental response with limited defense
budgets has, in turn, meant that all three services have been sluggish in devel-
oping RMA plans. However, one area that has witnessed significant change in
the CF is command and control. Over the past few years, numerous new bod-
ies have been established, including a Joint Imagery Centre, an Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Fusion Centre, and a Joint Operations
Group.53 As can be seen from these examples, the notion of “jointness,” which
many believe to be a key component of the RMA, has been eagerly adopted by
DND. An additional step has been the amalgamation of the 1st Canadian Di-
vision Headquarters with the Joint Force Headquarters, to create the Canadian
Joint Force Headquarters.54 While limited in terms of capabilities, each of these
new structures demonstrates some recognition that a transformation in com-
mand and control is required in the RMA environment.
DND has also signified its intention to create a new, highly mobile ground
force. In 2000, the minister of national defense announced the CF’s plan to es-
tablish “a combat-ready strike force to respond swiftly to global crises to prevent
the loss of innocent life and strengthen Canada’s influence with its allies.”55 This
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force similarly seems to be an attempt at creating a more RMA-relevant force, as
rapid response has been shown to be crucial in the post–Cold War strategic
environment.
In spite of these changes and plans, however, the services themselves have
very limited abilities to restructure themselves to take advantage of changes in
military technology. Each of the services—but in particular the air force and the
army—has dated or even antiquated equipment and is unlikely to acquire ad-
vanced weapons platforms in the near future. The implications of this develop-
ment have so far gone largely unrecognized in DND;56 this, however, cannot
continue much longer, at least not if the department intends to formulate a co-
herent defense strategy. To put it simply, a moment of truth is coming for the Ca-
nadian military, which would be wise to consider the options and make its
choices well before decisions are effectively made for it.
The Army
Of the three services of the CF, the army is in the worst shape militarily, presently
the least able to carry out its stated missions, let alone accept new ones. It also
suffers from dated equipment and political indifference. The result is a force un-
certain of its present and future, and an unlikely candidate to receive priority.
The army today numbers about twenty-three thousand personnel, or about
40 percent of the total CF.57 This numerical strength should not come as a sur-
prise, given the wide range of tasks the army (theoretically, if not in practice)
performs, ranging from conventional warfare at one end of the conflict spec-
trum, to peacekeeping and other low-intensity conflict (LIC) missions, and
more recently, to domestic tasks like fighting floods.58
However, it is peacekeeping that has become most important for the army
over the last several decades. Successive Canadian governments have empha-
sized peacekeeping, and there is a widespread international perception that the
army has been geared specifically toward the task.59 In addition, the declaratory
Canadian emphasis—at least during the five-year tenure (1996–2000) of For-
eign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy—on “soft power” and “human security”
has given peacekeeping and other LIC tasks priority over more traditional army
missions.60 The result is an army with a combat capability that has been system-
atically reduced for decades.
The prominence of peacekeeping (and related peace-support operations) can
be seen most dramatically by examining the number of such missions that the
Canadian Forces have accepted in the recent past. Canada participated in nine-
teen United Nations and non-UN peacekeeping assignments between 1947 and
1986; that number ballooned to over twenty-five between 1988 and 2000.61 The
acceptance of so many missions has created considerable strain for the army,
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which has frequently found it difficult to provide the forces pledged by the
government.62
Peacekeeping, however, is essentially irrelevant to the RMA, a fact having ma-
jor implications if the army is to remain interoperable with the land forces of
Canada’s allies. This is not to suggest that RMA weapons can play no role in
peacekeeping or other LIC missions; nonetheless, the technological require-
ments of advanced military platforms, combined with the emphasis on sensing
equipment, simply do not translate well at the low end of the spectrum and may
even be counterproductive in some cases.63
Peacekeeping aside, the army is largely incapable of carrying out its present
commitments and would require a complete overhaul to become more RMA
relevant. The army’s standing field forces consist of three mechanized brigade
groups. Each group is composed of three infantry battalions, an armored regi-
ment, an artillery regiment, and an engineer regiment, along with combat sup-
port and combat service support.64 While each brigade should number about six
thousand personnel, their current strength is actually about 4,500 (a figure that
is reached only with the inclusion of hundreds of reservists). Further, while each
should be capable of operating without assistance, the reality is that were a Ca-
nadian brigade group deployed, it would be heavily dependent on additional re-
sources provided by allies, especially for fire support, engineers, and electronic
warfare.
The term “mechanized brigade group” is a peculiarly Canadian one and thus
deserves additional comment. A brigade is a basic army formation; a brigade
group is more comprehensive. A mechanized brigade group is based predomi-
nantly on infantry but is equipped with a variety of fighting vehicles. These vehi-
cles normally include tanks and armored personnel carriers, as well as
long-range howitzers and other artillery. This combination of firepower and
mobility allows the group, ideally, to undertake a broad range of operations.65
For overseas engagements, the army is supposed to be able to field a single
“Sabre” brigade group, which consists of mechanized infantry battalions, an ar-
mor regiment, armored reconnaissance, an engineer regiment, and a service
battalion. Such a brigade has a complement of six thousand personnel and
would be augmented by air defense and tactical aviation. Units drawn from the
three field brigades would form the Sabre brigade, which, it is envisaged, would
operate as part of a larger multinational or binational force and would necessar-
ily be able to integrate its combat functions with those of the larger formation.66
However, the Sabre brigade is not designed to take part in high-intensity com-
bat, only low-to-middle-level engagements. Thus, if it were ever deployed—
which it has never been—particular care would have to be taken to ensure that it
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was not placed in a sophisticated warfare environment, a restriction that obvi-
ously reduces its utility.67
As to what would constitute an appropriate conflict for the brigade, there are
grounds for concern. According to the army, “low-level operations” involve ter-
rorism or some form of insurgency (with the application of the minimum nec-
essary force), while a “midlevel operation” is another term for limited war, like
the Gulf War or the 1999 Kosovo campaign, where the use of force is localized
and noncontinuous. Lastly, “high-intensity conflict” refers to total war. How-
ever, in the twenty-first century, it is not at all clear that such terms have much
meaning or that they delineate operationally distinct missions. Put simply, as 11
September has demonstrated, terrorism can inflict enormous devastation (in-
deed, should terrorist groups get hold of weapons of mass destruction, the re-
sults could be indistinguishable from those of total war), and the fight against
terrorism requires an array of capabilities and strategies. Further, the prolifera-
tion of sophisticated conventional weapons in the 1980s and ’90s means that
even substate actors and terrorist groups may now possess significant military
capabilities; consequently, considerable caution must be employed when engag-
ing them. Thus the operational distinctions that Canada seems to assume may
no longer exist. The net result is that the constraints limiting the Sabre brigade
must be interpreted so broadly as to all but preclude its participation in opera-
tions against any country or actor with modern defensive capabilities.
The question of whether the Canadian Forces are even capable of deploying
the Sabre brigade is an open one. While officially DND maintains that it can ful-
fil all its commitments, the army has acknowledged that deploying the brigade
would require its “entire focus” and could require the withdrawal of Canadian
peacekeepers overseas.68 In addition, should the unit suffer significant casual-
ties, finding replacements would pose an enormous challenge, one that would
quickly overwhelm the manpower reserves (such as they are) of the army. Fur-
ther, the army lacks strategic lift; the CC-130 Hercules transports (to be exam-
ined below) would be hard pressed to carry much of the brigade’s equipment.69
Lastly, regular training in the Canadian army has been funded at the subunit
level only; adequate training at the battle group and brigade levels is lacking.70
Doubts regarding the Sabre brigade were raised anew in August 2002, when it
was reported that DND had considered deploying it to Afghanistan as part of
Canada’s commitment to the U.S.-led war on terrorism.71 However (as noted be-
low), concern over the CF’s ability to maintain and operate the brigade, ac-
knowledged inability to provide adequate medical supplies, and insufficient
logistical support led to a decision to send a much smaller contingent. The con-
troversy has led to renewed speculation regarding the future of the brigade and
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the desirability of maintaining a “capability” that the Canadian Forces, in reality,
cannot exercise.
With regard to equipment, the army—perhaps not surprisingly, given its in-
ability to engage in high-intensity combat—must make do with a long list of
outdated weapon systems. Indeed, the army itself has provided the most damn-
ing critique of its capabilities. In a 1998 report, the Land Forces Command
noted that “the Army’s ‘core’ combat capability remains constrained by obsoles-
cent and obsolete 1960s and 1970s equipment that impose limitations on the
tasks that can be undertaken with acceptable risks and is becoming increasingly
expensive to operate and maintain.”72
The army’s primary combat weapon system remains the Leopard I main bat-
tle tank, acquired in the mid-1970s. While a sophisticated tank at the time it was
introduced, the Canadian Leopard has not been regularly upgraded; it is essen-
tially unchanged from the original model. With a (relatively) small 105 mm main
gun and no reactive armor, the Leopards are a marginal weapon at best on the
modern battlefield. Given the dramatic changes that have occurred in tank tech-
nology over the last twenty-five years, the Leopards would prove easy targets in
virtually any combat environment. They are presently, at last, getting badly
needed renovations, but few defense observers believe that they will be apprecia-
bly strengthened as a result.73
An additional army deficiency is the lack of tactical aviation. Unlike the
United States (with its AH-64 Apache), Canada has never owned a dedicated
attack helicopter. Instead, it assumes that allies will provide such capabilities.
Canadian army helicopters primarily perform reconnaissance and transport
missions.74 To accomplish such tasks, the army acquired in the mid-1990s a hun-
dred Griffon helicopters, a platform based on a commercial civilian
design (by Bell Helicopter). The program has been plagued by con-
troversy, uncertainty, and deficiencies that have been well docu-
mented.75 Indeed, in the summer of 2002, a quarter of the Griffon
fleet was temporarily grounded after a fatal accident in which a
tail-rotor blade disintegrated.76
There are too many additional army equipment deficiencies to list here. How-
ever, among the most glaring are the lack of an IFF (identification, friend or foe)
system to reduce the possibility of “friendly fire” accidents, limited mine-
detection and clearing capabilities, few intelligence assets, and an inadequate
capacity to decontaminate personnel in the event of exposure to nuclear, biolog-
ical, or chemical weapons.
Ironically, the incapability of Canadian land forces to wage high-intensity
warfare and their marginal utility in midlevel operations effectively reduce the
importance of army interoperability. A force has little need to ensure that its
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equipment and training allows seamless integration into a larger formation if it
cannot take part in most of that formation’s operations. As Joel Sokolsky has re-
cently noted, there are different levels of interoperability, of which the highest
(which he calls “a seamless fusion of military forces”) is required in “high in-
tensity combat operations.” For various LIC missions, Sokolsky argues, “a lower
level of interoperability [is] necessary.”77
This is not to suggest, however, that maintaining an interoperable land force is
not a professed goal of the Canadian army, for it clearly is. The value of comparable
training procedures and doctrines has been highlighted by the Canadian participa-
tion in the war in Afghanistan and the deployment there of 850 soldiers of Princess
Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. Prior to their arrival, the commander of the U.S.
forces in southern Afghanistan said that the integration of the two countries’
forces would be “seamless”;78 this characterization, defense analysts explained,
would result from common training practices.79 The Canadian troops left Afghani-
stan in July 2002, after only six months, but there is widespread acceptance that they
performed a valuable mission—primarily, assisting U.S. forces in capturing remain-
ing al-Qa‘ida and Taliban fighters and securing the Kandahar airport—and made a
major contribution to the larger war effort.80 The interoperability achieved in Afghan-
istan was the result of years of careful planning and reflected a strategic decision to
bring Canadian army operational procedures in line with those of the United States
(at least to the extent possible, given Canadian military weakness).81
As for modernization plans, a few army initiatives can be noted. The army is
taking some initial steps to develop a capacity to function on the emerging “digi-
tized” battlefield.82 The Iris Tactical Command, Control, and Communications
System consists of handheld and vehicle-mounted radios that will provide a se-
cure communications capability. Further, the Situational Awareness subsystem
will show unit commanders where all friendly and enemy vehicles are, with pin-
point accuracy.83 The army is also in the process of modernizing its armored
fighting vehicles, an important step in the creation of a more mobile force.84
With regard to plans to reshape the army, a study prepared in 2000, Army of
Tomorrow, outlined a blueprint for a transformed Canadian land force.85 The
document calls for a more technology-dependent army, utilizing advanced sen-
sors and precision weapons, and capable of participating in joint and combined
operations. Perhaps most critically, it calls for a much smaller force, with only
two brigades and a significantly reduced artillery corps.
An even more important army blueprint was released in May 2002 by the
service’s commander, Lieutenant General Mike Jeffrey. In a document titled
Advancing with Purpose, Jeffrey called for a radically reformulated Canadian
army, one that would be based around units of one hundred soldiers instead of
the present seven-hundred-man battalions.86 Jeffrey’s plan would create a
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much more flexible structure and would place considerable emphasis on the
readiness of light infantry and on command and communications functions.87
While the plan certainly represents a bold rethinking of the size and purpose of
the army, it is difficult to overstate the financial impetus behind it; as Jeffrey
has noted, “I don’t see a better way unless of course someone has got a lot more
money to build me a lot bigger army.”88
These initiatives aside, inadequate equipment, uncertain strategic goals, and
near-constant manpower reductions have produced a service in crisis, as many
have observed.89 For example, in 1999 the Conference of Defence Associations, a
pro-DND lobby group, stated that “the Canadian Forces, especially the army, are
on the verge of collapse.”90 As noted, the army itself has been surprisingly can-
did, accepting that it is in a “fragile” state, with erosion beginning to set in.91 In
short, the prognosis for the army is bleak. The emphasis on peacekeeping has re-
sulted in a force that can take part in only low-level combat, quite a contrast to
the role the Canadian army played in the last century’s two global conflicts.92
The Air Force
Like the army, the Canadian air force is battling equipment obsolescence and de-
clining capabilities. Recent engagements, particularly Operation ALLIED FORCE
over Kosovo in 1999 (the Canadian portion of which was called Operation
ECHO), demonstrated serious interoperability concerns, concerns that placed al-
lied aircraft and their crews in potential danger. Given the prohibitive cost of re-
placements for the ageing CF-18s, the limited roles that the present aircraft can
perform, and questionable political support, the air force also is a poor candi-
date for prioritization over the other services.93
The decline of the air force has been particularly dramatic since 1994. That
year’s white paper outlined a series of steps necessitated by the reduction in de-
fense spending. Most critically, expenditures on fighter forces and their support
were to be reduced by 25 percent. To achieve those savings, the air force was re-
quired to retire its CF-5 fleet, cut its fighter-related overhead, reduce annual au-
thorized flying hours, and scale back the number of operational CF-18s, the sole
remaining combat aircraft in its inventory.94 As a result, measured by the num-
ber of personnel (thirteen thousand), the air force today is the smallest it has
been since 1948.95
Canada’s 138 CF-18s were purchased in the early 1980s and are the original
A/B models produced by the American manufacturer McDonnell Douglas. A
second version of the plane, the C/D model, was produced in the late 1980s and
early 1990s and included a large number of improvements over the original. In
1998, the Boeing Corporation—having purchased McDonnell Douglas several
years earlier—began manufacturing the third variant of the aircraft, the E/F
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(nicknamed “Super Hornet”), a model that became operational in 2002.96 All
F-18s in the active inventory of the United States are already at the C/D stan-
dard and will be upgraded to E/F by mid-decade. In contrast, most CF-18s
have never been upgraded (although a current modernization program will
be examined below), with the result that many of their systems are approach-
ing obsolescence and are facing serious challenges in supportability and the
availability of spare parts.97
Canada’s CF-18s have taken part in two major conflicts in the last decade. In
the Gulf War, twenty-four CF-18s were deployed to perform defensive combat
air patrols; in the war’s later stages the aircraft also performed sweep and escort
missions—the first time since the Korean War that Canadian aircraft had been
involved in offensive air operations.98 In 1999, eighteen CF-18s were deployed to
Aviano, Italy, where they took part in ALLIED FORCE. Ca-
nadian aircraft played an active part in the bombing cam-
paign, one of only five Nato countries to do so (the others
being the United States, Britain, France, and Germany).99
With regard to Operation DESERT STORM, there were
numerous interoperability problems associated with the
CF-18. For example, Canadian aircraft were deficient in
tactical air communications equipment. Specifically, the
CF-18s lacked the Link-4 ship-to-aircraft datalink system,
necessary for secure transmissions with the Aegis antiair-
craft cruisers that guarded the coalition surface fleet. Until the problem was re-
solved by an upgrade arrangement negotiated with the United States, it
delayed Canadian engagements against hostile Iraqi aircraft.100
The Canadian sweep-and-escort missions in the Gulf raised two different sets
of problems. The first stemmed from a lack of secure voice radio communica-
tions, which forced a change in coalition bombing missions to higher altitudes
for greater protection against enemy missiles and artillery.101 The second prob-
lem was inadequate refuelling capability. At the onset of the operation Canada
deployed a refuelling aircraft, a converted Boeing 707 nicknamed “Husky One,”
to support the CF-18s. But after sixteen consecutive days of operation, the air-
craft was grounded due to hydraulic problems. This became a serious matter for
the CF-18s, as most of the coalition tankers in the region had nozzles that were
incompatible with CF-18 refuelling probes.102
Additional problems were experienced with the Canadian bombing effort.
Most critical was a lack of precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Canadian
CF-18s had not been reconfigured to carry the new, more accurate ordnance and
as a result were limited to dropping “dumb” bombs against Iraqi artillery and ve-
hicle convoys.103 A further difficulty involved doctrinal differences and tactical-
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level training. For example, Canadian pilots had not been trained to perform
high-altitude bombing, a problem that was rectified only through extensive
training and exercises.
The air force spent the years following DESERT STORM addressing some of the
problems that had been identified, but there were some notable failures, with the
result that many of the same issues resurfaced during ALLIED FORCE in 1999. For
example, Canada (still) did not have a strategic air-to-air refuelling capability; it
was wholly dependent on the United States in this respect.104 Further, Canada
had acquired only a limited number of laser-guided PGMs prior to the cam-
paign;105 Canada did not acquire any satellite-guided munitions.106 In addition,
Canadian aircraft lacked night-vision devices and helmet-mounted bombsight
“cueing” systems, the absence of which degraded the safety of their maneuvering
and the effectiveness of their bombing. Most critically, Canada still had no secure
voice communications—it was the only Nato country that did not—a failing that
forced the entire allied air effort to use single-frequency (and thus jammable)
equipment.107 An air force assessment of the campaign concluded that “we could
not repeat the same level of activity, and in most scenarios we would not be per-
mitted to participate to the same extent, due to our increasingly outdated equip-
ment.”108
In 1999, with the CF-18s approaching the ends of their expected service lives
in five to ten years, the air force introduced a plan designed to keep the aircraft
flying until approximately 2020. The Incremental Modernization Program
(IMP) has a budget of eight hundred million dollars (U.S.) and is now well un-
der way. The project consists of ten independent ventures, including enhanced
computer capabilities, new electronic warfare systems, and an improved radar
suite.109 However, even after all the upgrades are completed (in 2008), the CF-18s
will have been brought up only to the operational standard the U.S. F-18s at-
tained almost twenty years ago. Even more worrisome, with the introduction of
the F-22 Raptor in the United States in 2005 and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in
2008 (and the expected gradual retirement of the F-18s), U.S. aircraft standards
will by then have been entirely transformed, well beyond the capability of the
CF-18s.110 In addition, the air forces of many of Canada’s allies will receive new
aircraft over the next decade, making effective cooperation increasingly un-
likely.111 Lastly, with price tags of ninety million dollars (U.S.) per aircraft for the
F-22 and about fifty million for the JSF, both aircraft will be far too expensive
for the CF to purchase (barring an unexpected and massive defense spending
increase).112
For transport, the air force has thirty-two turboprop CC-130 Hercules air-
craft. Their most important function is to carry cargo, but they can also be used
to carry passengers, and they have a marginal capability for aerial refuelling. The
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Hercules is also the principal fixed-wing search-and-rescue aircraft of the Cana-
dian Forces.113
In service since the 1960s (although some were purchased in the early 1970s),
the Hercules, like many other Canadian weapons platforms, are nearing the ends
of their operational lives. Indeed, DND recently acknowledged that only a third
of the fleet is available for daily operations; the majority require nearly continu-
ous repairs.114 The retirement of the Hercules will pose a particularly daunting
challenge, as these highly versatile aircraft have been depended upon for virtu-
ally all deployments of CF personnel abroad.
While a comprehensive modernization program could extend the life of the
Hercules force for perhaps ten years, a replacement aircraft will have to be pur-
chased in the next few years if DND is to maintain a transport capability past
2010. The obvious candidate is the C-130J Hercules, a modernized version of the
venerable aircraft. However, it costs about seventy million dollars (U.S.) per
plane and has cargo limitations; the government has to date not approved any
such purchase.115 A second possibility is a limited acquisition of more expensive
Boeing C-17 Globemasters, an aircraft that is now widely used by the U.S. Air
Force.116 Despite the cost of either option, purchasing a replacement aircraft for
the Hercules has become a top priority of DND; the 2001–2002 Report on Plans
and Priorities declares that “develop[ing] options to enhance [Canadian forces’]
deployability, including strategic lift” is a primary objective of force structure
modernization.117
Finally, despite attempts to emphasize the air force’s nonmilitary capabilities,
airpower runs inherently counter to the “soft power” view of the world that pre-
vails within the Liberal government, particularly the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs.118 As a result, the air force is unlikely to attract significant political support
any time soon.
The air force, then, is facing a difficult period. Its sole combat plane is verging
on obsolescence, it has no strategic lift capability to speak of, and its transport
aircraft are ageing and increasingly error prone. All this will seriously impede
the efforts of the Canadian air force to become functionally interoperable with
the U.S. Air Force. There is little question that in the opening stages of future
conflicts (as in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan) the United States will
look to utilize its airpower, a capability that no prospective enemy can match. In-
deed, it has been recently observed that “across the spectrum of conflict, air su-
premacy is now the sine qua non of U.S. military activity, the arm of choice and
the enabler and protector of all other arms.”119 Thus Canada’s air weakness may
effectively negate its ability to participate in U.S.-led military operations.
Certainly, if it were up to DND, Canada would retain a sophisticated air com-
bat capability and would remain a potential air coalition partner of the United
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States. One could argue that the Incremental Modernization Program is de-
signed with precisely this in mind. However, if this is indeed the air force’s intent,
the IMP is not sufficient, nor is it apparent that any country of Canada’s size and
resources could do much better. Combat aircraft are presently undergoing a rev-
olution in terms of performance and capabilities, a transformation not experi-
enced since the late 1940s and early 1950s, when jet engines and air-to-air
missiles were first introduced. Only countries with large and sophisticated mili-
taries (the United States, Britain, France, Israel, and perhaps one or two others)
will now be able to field first-rate air forces.
Other nations are left with the options of either operating second-tier air
arms or concentrating on noncombat air missions (for example, command and
control or aerial surveillance). Given U.S. air superiority over both friends and
foes alike, the question needs to be asked: do allies of the United States need to
operate advanced combat aircraft? It is highly unlikely that any Western country
would feel obliged to go it alone against a prospective foe; fielding and maintain-
ing advanced combat aircraft in order to do so are now very demanding and ex-
pensive tasks. In any case, the choice will be difficult for Canada, a country with a
long and proud record of aerial service.120
Canadian CF-18s have played no part in the bombing campaign over Afghan-
istan. Their inability to operate from U.S. aircraft carriers was the official reason
given.121 An additional explanation, however, may have been that the United
States desired the assistance of only forces that would add appreciably to the
campaign.
The Navy
The navy is in the best shape of Canada’s three services, and it is the obvious can-
didate for prioritization. It enjoys relatively modern equipment, strong political
support, and a strategic mission that is broadly consistent with Canadian for-
eign policy goals. In addition, it has an excellent working relationship with the
U.S. Navy, perhaps the closest of any American ally. A decision to prioritize the
navy will not only allow it to purchase badly needed equipment but will ensure a
strong Canadian naval presence well into the future.
The navy’s major warships are twelve Halifax-class frigates, four Iroquois-
class destroyers, two fleet support vessels, and four submarines. In addition, it
operates a maritime aviation force of thirty Sea King helicopters and twenty-one
long-range patrol aircraft.122 Lastly, the navy has recently acquired twelve mari-
time coastal defense vessels.
The frigates are the pride of the fleet. Delivered between 1992 and 1998, they
can perform a variety of roles, depending on the circumstances, against under-
surface, surface, or air threats. A Halifax-class frigate can search some thirty-two
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thousand square kilometers (about 12,400 square miles) of ocean in about ten
days, before it requires refuelling.123 To detect and track submarines, and to ex-
tend the range of territory that the frigate is able to scout, each frigate carries one
Sea King helicopter (examined below). The frigates are quite heavily armed with an
array of missiles, guns, and defensive systems.
The destroyers, while hardly new (they were purchased in the early 1970s),
have been extensively modernized and refitted over the years and
are still effective warships. They have been outfitted with an
area-air-defense system by which they can extend protection to
other vessels—radars, an inventory of twenty-nine long-range
surface-to-air missiles, and chaff launchers. The destroyers have
also been fitted with command and control facilities that allow
them to serve as flagships for Canadian or allied task groups.124
This combination of modern air defense and command and con-
trol capabilities merited redesignation of these ships as guided
missile destroyers (DDGs). It should be noted, though, that the
destroyers are scheduled to be withdrawn from service at the end
of the decade.125
The navy’s Victoria-class submarines are in the process of being intro-
duced. Purchased (slightly used) from Britain in the mid-1990s, they offer an
enormous improvement over the now-withdrawn Oberon-class submarines,
which had been in service since 1963 and were effectively obsolete.126 While the
Russian navy does not pose the threat that the Soviet navy did during the Cold
War, it retains a substantial submarine force, which still patrols off the North
American coasts. The new submarines will provide valuable surveillance as well
as antisubmarine capabilities.127
Combined, these three warship classes offer Canada fairly robust presence
and significant combat capabilities. Furthermore, and critically, they offer a
high degree of interoperability with allied navies, and in particular the U.S.
Navy. Perhaps the best example of this is the ability of Canadian frigates and
destroyers to operate in U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. Since the Gulf War,
Canadian warships have frequently been integrated into such groups.128 This
has occurred most recently with Operation APOLLO (the Canadian designa-
tion for its contribution to the U.S. war on terrorism), where six Canadian
warships—four frigates, one destroyer, and one supply ship—joined the
U.S.-led fleet.129 Extensive combined training allowed Canadian vessels to do so
quite easily, a degree of interoperability that is highly unusual in the naval
world.130
Among their naval allies, the Americans consider the Canadian navy “high
end.”131 With an emphasis on command and control along with intelligence and
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surveillance, it has a demonstrated ability to undertake a broad array of mis-
sions. The navy’s blueprint for the next several decades—a document entitled
Leadmark—notes that during the Gulf War the Canadian task group com-
mander was the only non-American warfare commander, a development that
was possible because of the compatibility and interoperability of Canadian ships
with those of the United States.132 Similarly, the upgraded destroyers and frigates
have frequently played leading roles in multilateral operations.133
In the area of maritime aviation, however, the navy is badly in need of mod-
ernization; these needs point to the advantages that naval prioritization would
offer. The navy’s maritime helicopter, the Sea King, is completely obsolete; it
poses a danger to both its crew and nearby ships virtually every time it flies
(which, given its enormous maintenance requirements, is thankfully not of-
ten).134 In service since 1963, Canada’s fleet of Sea Kings was initially slated for
replacement in the early 1990s. However, upon election in 1993, one of Prime
Minister Jean Chretien’s first official acts was to cancel the helicopter project
(and pay the hefty three-hundred-million-dollar U.S. cancellation fee). The
government announced its intention to replace the fleet in 2000;135 the time-
table, however, remains unclear, and the Sea Kings
will likely be flying until at least 2008.136 This is an
embarrassment not only to the crews who are forced
to keep these antiques in the air but more broadly to
all Canadians, who are apparently content to ask CF
naval aviators to fly aircraft that are poorly equipped,
occasionally unstable, and incapable of operating in
most combat environments.137
The other major naval aircraft is the CP-140 Au-
rora (an adaptation of the U.S. P-3 Orion), which is
also nearing the end of its operational life. In service since 1980, the Auroras per-
form an array of surveillance and reconnaissance missions, in addition to anti-
submarine warfare tasks. As a result, however, they have been operated hard.
Having exceeded the deadline set in the United States for their refurbishment,
the Auroras have problems with corrosion and structural fatigue. In addition,
the now-familiar Canadian practice of not upgrading aircraft has resulted in
service and maintenance difficulties.138
The problems associated with naval aviation notwithstanding, the Canadian
navy is in surprisingly good shape.139 Certainly, there is an element of luck involved;
it was the navy’s good fortune that it was the last service to undergo a major mod-
ernization program before the defense budget was effectively gutted in 1993. How-
ever, luck alone cannot explain the navy’s balanced force—for that, credit must be
R I C H T E R 8 7
Destroyer HMCS Iroquois
21
Richter: “Alongside the Best”?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
given to the navy’s senior officers, who designed a fleet approach that combines sev-
eral types of capabilities.
Another factor in the navy’s favor is the broad range of operations that naval
forces can perform. Leadmark divides naval functions into three basic roles—
military, diplomatic, and constabulary.140 Under military missions it lists com-
mand of the sea, sea control, sea denial, battlespace dominance, fleet-in-being, mar-
itime power projection, and maritime maneuver. Among diplomatic roles, it
identifies ten distinct missions, including preventive diplomacy, coercion, mari-
time interdiction, peace-support operations, civil military cooperation, and
humanitarian assistance. Lastly, constabulary tasks comprise another six func-
tions, among which are sovereignty patrols, aid to the civil power, search and
rescue, and disaster relief.
This lengthy list of functions makes the navy ideally suited to carry out Canadian
foreign policy. As noted earlier, contributing to international peace and security
through multilateral operations remains a primary foreign policy goal of Canada,
and among the three services the navy clearly offers the broadest array of capabili-
ties to carry out this mission. As evidence, the Canadian navy has frequently de-
ployed when regional or ethnic conflict is seen as
requiring Western intervention. Thus, in the re-
cent past, the navy has sailed to Southeast Asia to
support operations in East Timor and participated
in the embargo against Haiti; it is currently engaged
in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf as part of the
campaign in Afghanistan.141
Any decision to prioritize the navy would
have an immediately beneficial impact, as badly
needed modernization programs could then be
undertaken quickly. In addition, because the
navy’s primary warships are all relatively modern, replacement should not be an
issue for at least another ten years.142 Even then, a decision could be made simply
to retire (rather than replace) the destroyers. Lastly, given its impressive degree
of interoperability with the U.S. Navy, the Canadian navy is well positioned to
participate in a wide range of missions, from peace-support/humanitarian aid
to sophisticated conventional warfare.
ALONGSIDE THE BEST, AGAINST THE BEST?
The decline of Canadian military capabilities has occurred with the apparent
approval of much of the Canadian public. Defense commentators and what re-
mains of the Progressive Conservative and Alliance parties have strongly criti-
cized the Liberal government for its defense cuts.143 Nevertheless, the reality is
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that, as Canadians have repeatedly demonstrated, when it comes to proposed
government spending increases, defense simply does not fare very well in com-
parison to programs like health care or education.144
Nor does this seem likely to change in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in
New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. While the Canadian govern-
ment has pledged to pay more attention to security issues, there is no indication
that DND will be getting any significant infusion of cash as a result.145 Indeed,
since the attacks, not only has the government announced only minor increases
in defense spending (of the additional five billion [U.S.] allocated for security in
the 10 December 2001 federal budget, only eight hundred million spread over
five years was earmarked for defense), but it has also declared that a defense pol-
icy review needs to be undertaken—a sign, many observ-
ers believe, that the government is finally prepared to
acknowledge that the fiscal basis of the 1994 Defence
White Paper can no longer be met.146
If nothing else, though, 11 September has shifted pub-
lic attention to the Canadian military in a way not seen in
decades. The Canadian Forces have come under scrutiny
not for their misadventures but for their capabilities, and
the tools they have—and perhaps more importantly, do
not have—to perform the tasks that are requested of them. While it is difficult to
predict what might come of this newfound attention, it is worth noting that this
debate is taking place against a backdrop of studies and reports that allege that
Canada is a “declining” international power.147 If it is to reclaim its status as a
“middle” power, these analysts argue, it needs to start paying the expenditures in
defense that are expected of an advanced, Western country that is a longtime
member of Nato and a partner with the United States in the defense of North
America.148
DND must not only deal with antiquated equipment and inadequate funding
but battle a political establishment in Ottawa that appears to do everything pos-
sible to discredit it. In a recent example, Prime Minister Chretien stated in a
year-ending 2001 interview that people who call for increases in defense spend-
ing—who, it should be emphasized, include Canada’s auditor general as well as
members of his own party—are essentially pawns of the arms industry. As the
prime minister noted with his customary eloquence, “there is an industry that is
very important that produces armaments for government . . . that [says] you
should buy more of our stuff.”149 The prime minister went on to state that the
Canadian Forces are “well equipped” (a point he has made many times over the
last few years) and to suggest that DND’s troubles have more to do with outdated
strategies than with fiscal constraints.150
R I C H T E R 8 9
CH-124 Sea King
23
Richter: “Alongside the Best”?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
There is no question, however, that years of budget cuts have left the CF in a
precarious position. Despite the goals set in the 1994 Defence White Paper, Can-
ada today cannot field military forces that can fight “alongside the best, against
the best.” Over the course of the past decade, the Canadian Forces have lost sig-
nificant combat capability; once lost, such capability is difficult to restore. As has
been recently noted, “Neither flexible nor multipurpose anymore, the Canadian
Forces, by gradual but incessant reductions, have been ushered in the direction
of the glorified sovereignty protection and peacekeeping roles its fiercer critics
had for a decade and more demanded.”151 Even the defense minister, John
McCallum, has begun to acknowledge the severity of the situation, recently as-
serting that the CF have been stretched past the “breaking point.”152
Nonetheless, Canadian foreign policy remains internationalist.153 While the
tenure of Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthy has ended, his successors, John
Manley and, more recently, Bill Graham, have continued to stress the interna-
tional role that Canada can play.154 During much of the 1970s, the Liberal gov-
ernment’s emphasis on “human security” and “soft power” downplayed the
importance of military assets, thereby making them broadly consistent with
Canada’s declining capabilities. But those days seem to be (thankfully) over, as
Manley’s conception of foreign policy is far more de-
pendent on traditional “hard power” resources and rec-
ognizes the linkages between political influence and
military power. Indeed, Manley has even gone so far as to
suggest that if Canada wants to be taken more “seriously”
in world affairs, it needs to increase its military, an opin-
ion that would have verged on sacrilege in Ottawa just a
few years ago.155
Further, Canada’s foreign policy internationalism is
strongly supported by the public, a finding clearly sup-
ported by polling data. Respondents to one such poll apparently surprised re-
searchers with the depth of their understanding, leading pollsters to conclude
that “Canadians are passionate about world affairs, interventionist, and more
united than one might have predicted.”156 A majority of respondents indicated
they would consider a Canadian military response appropriate in the event of
another Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or a Rwanda-type genocide in Africa.
The disconnect, then, between Canada’s foreign and defense policy is clear.
Simply stated, DND is incapable of fielding the forces required to match Can-
ada’s foreign policy rhetoric, and it is unlikely to acquire those forces in the fu-
ture. There are, however, steps that DND can take that will produce at least some
degree of combat capability. The army and air force suffer from advanced equip-
ment obsolescence; their prognoses for future interoperability are poor. On the
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other hand, the navy has a reasonably modern fleet, can perform a wide array of
missions, enjoys widespread political support, and already offers significant
interoperability capabilities. A decision to give it priority, fiscal and otherwise,
over the other services would give the Canadian Forces a significant capacity to
participate in multinational coalition operations well into the twenty-first
century.
Let us be clear, though. There is no satisfaction to be found in recommending
that the needs of the navy be prioritized over those of the army or air force. As
many observers have noted, the future strategic environment is uncertain, and
the varied types of threats that Canada faces calls for broadly capable armed
forces (like those envisioned by the 1994 Defence White Paper).157 In an ideal
world, Canadians and their government would take military matters seriously
and ensure that the Department of National Defence was funded to carry out the
tasks demanded of it. But Canada is not living in an ideal world, nor is it likely to
enjoy one any time soon. Military spending in Canada is likely to remain low.158
Accordingly, the government and DND must make some critical decisions.
There are indications that DND is beginning to appreciate the challenges and
is finally starting to ask the necessary difficult questions. In a sustainability re-
view conducted in November 2001, DND acknowledged that it was in a period
of “relentless decline” and that “major trade-offs” might have to be made to en-
sure that some advanced capabilities are maintained.159 “The current situation
cannot endure. Either corrective action is taken now, or Defence will gradually
become unable to meet its white paper commitments and respond to emerging
challenges.” Most importantly, the report suggested that DND must begin mak-
ing choices as to which capabilities it wishes to maintain—perhaps between
numbers of personnel and investment in high-technology weapons platforms;
between flexible, multipurpose forces and single-purpose “niche” forces; be-
tween preparation for domestic tasks and for international ones; and maintain-
ing equal capabilities for the army, navy, and air force versus putting more
resources into one service at the expense of the others. While the report made no
recommendation, it noted that the time for making decisions is short and that
the consequences of making the wrong ones would be severe.
The concept of trade-offs was also raised in At a Crossroads, the report re-
leased by General R. R. Henault, the chief of the Defence Staff, in June 2002. He
concluded that “[DND] cannot invest in the new capabilities required to trans-
form the CF and remain interoperable and well equipped without divesting our-
selves of capabilities that have become less relevant to the twenty-first-century
battlespace. The transition will be difficult.”160 He offered no details as to which
capabilities had become “less relevant,” but he documented the difficulties and
challenges that both the army and air force face, while offering little but praise
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for the navy—“ton for ton, the Canadian Navy is currently as capable as any navy
in the world.”161
A decision to prioritize Canada’s navy also makes sense on strategic grounds.
In this regard, the war on terrorism launched by the United States against the
Taliban and al-Qa‘ida in Afghanistan in October 2001 has revealed interesting
changes in the way Western military operations are likely to be conducted in the
future. A new style of warfare employing small teams of special operations
forces on the ground supported by carrier-based and land-based aircraft may
well displace U.S. ground and tank forces on the battlefield.162 Four assets appear
to have been vital in the quick U.S. victory over the Taliban regime: special oper-
ations forces; long-range B-2 and B-52 bombers; “smart” weapons combined
with digital communications;163 and unmanned aerial vehicles, which now com-
bine reconnaissance capabilities with limited strike roles.164
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM has revealed that the United States will carefully
screen multilateral participation in future coalitions. The Americans will likely wel-
come Canada’s participation in future naval task forces (provided its maritime
forces remain capable and fully interoperable) but are unlikely to request its air or
ground assets. At the very least, the campaign suggests that only countries that
maintain highly sophisticated air and ground units will be “allowed” to participate
in U.S.-led operations; Canada abandoned that standard some time ago.165
In essence, Canada possesses armed forces with a marginal combat capability
in the current strategic environment and little hope of becoming more combat
capable in the future, while at the same time its government places a premium
on interoperable forces that can take full advantage of the revolution in military
affairs. Nor is the emphasis on interoperability likely to diminish; on the con-
trary, interoperable forces will remain critical to both the United States and its
allies, especially in a coalition context.166 As Lawrence Freedman recently pre-
dicted, “The most important allies of the United States will make an effort to
stay abreast of [advanced military] technologies and to adopt them where possi-
ble, if only for purposes of interoperability. . . . It will become the subscription to
be taken seriously as an ally.”167
However, at least with regard to the United States, the need for inter-
operability in particular instances has more to do with American political con-
cerns than strategic ones. Without doubt, the United States has the military
assets required to conduct unilateral operations any time it perceives its national
interests to be at stake (as it is essentially doing in Afghanistan).168 But when core
American interests are not directly threatened—as in Kosovo or the Gulf—
Washington prefers to have allies on board before undertaking military opera-
tions.169 Former secretary of defense William Perry has suggested, “The threat of
military force . . . will be maximally effective when political conditions permit
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the military force to be a broadly based coalition.”170 But the primary criterion
for joining U.S.-led coalitions is fielding defense forces that are broadly inter-
operable with American forces; offers of forces that have failed to remain
interoperable will likely result in polite refusals—an understandable response,
given the risks. Simply put, the United States is not willing to allow its preference
for working with allies to weaken its own defense posture. If the allies—includ-
ing Canada—wish to cooperate with the U.S. military, they must ensure that
their capabilities are up to the challenge.171
The Canadian Forces have entered a critical period, one that will determine
their force structure for the next several decades. At a time of fiscal challenge
and dramatic technological change, continuing the present fiction of general-
purpose combat forces is no longer sustainable. The events of 11 September and
the resulting U.S.-led war on terrorism have highlighted the importance of a
modern and capable military. The Department of National Defence needs to
prioritize if it is to retain a viable fighting force. To be sure, such decisions will
not be easy; they could spark internecine struggle within the military. Failure to
make them, however, would largely ensure that the present disconnect between
Canadian foreign and defense policy will become a permanent fixture of Cana-
dian statehood.
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